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In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant claims that “the first command” of all self-regarding duties 
is to know our “heart.” Kant ostensibly identifies our heart with our moral disposition. Strangely, 
this appears to be precisely the sort of knowledge that, elsewhere, Kant claims is epistemically 
inaccessible to us. While the more sophisticated attempts to resolve this difficulty succeed in 
situating an injunction to know the quality of one’s disposition within a Kantian epistemic 
framework, no account is wholly successful in explaining why Kant takes self-knowledge to be a 
necessary condition of virtue. To make sense of the priority Kant assigns to the pursuit of self-
knowledge, I argue that it is essential to understand the role of what has been called “generic” 
self-knowledge in Kant’s moral philosophy. I proceed to defend the place Kant grants moral self-
knowledge in his moral philosophy, primarily by developing a Kantian account of such “generic” 
self-knowledge. 
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Those familiar with Kant's moral philosophy primarily through the Groundwork are often 
surprised when they learn of the extent to which Kant emphasizes the importance of self-
knowledge in his later treatments of ethics. The first and most obvious reason for such surprise is 
that Kant does not make explicit mention of self-knowledge in his early writings on moral 
philosophy. The second is that, in many places in the Groundwork, Kant seems, to a fault, 
unconcerned with the complexities of human psychology and motivation.  
Kant’s emphasis on self-knowledge, while represented throughout his lectures and, to a 
limited extent, in the Critiques, culminates in the Metaphysics of Morals. There, Kant declares 
that self-knowledge is the “First Command of all duties to Oneself.” In order to address your 
self-regarding duties, you must attempt to 
know (scrutinize, fathom) yourself, not in terms of your natural perfection (your fitness or 
unfitness for all sorts of discretionary or even commanded ends) but rather in terms of 
your moral perfection in relation to your duty. That is, know your heart—whether it is 
good or evil, whether the source of your actions is pure or impure, and what can be 
imputed to you as belonging originally to the substance of a human being or as derived 
(acquired or developed) and belonging to your moral condition (MM 6:441).1 
 
This dense passage raises at least four questions: first, what is the “heart”? Second, what does it 
mean to “know, scrutinize or fathom” it?  Third, what makes one's heart good or evil? Finally, 
why are we commanded, in the first place, to know ourselves?  The first question concerns the 
proper object of self-knowledge; the second, the method by which self-knowledge is best 
                                                 
1
 In this paper, references will be made according to the following method. Citations from Kant’s works will be 
made parenthetically according to convention: Citations from the Critique of Pure Reason will be located by the  
first and second edition pagination  included in major English translations of the work, and the title will be 
abbreviated, KrV. Other references to Kant's work will be located by Academy pagination, and their titles 
abbreviated as indicated the first time  they are cited.  Works  by other authors will be cited in  footnotes. The 
translation of  The Metaphysics of Morals is Gregor's: Kant, Immanuel. The Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Mary J. 
Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996.  
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achieved; the third, the criteria by which we are to assess the information we obtain about 
ourselves according to the proper methods; and the fourth, the purpose of self-knowledge. 
 This thesis has three main parts. The first part considers each of the above questions 
concerning the nature and place of moral self-knowledge within Kant's philosophical framework. 
Toward this end, I review the small but growing body of literature on Kantian moral self-
knowledge. I then argue, in the second part, that each extant account of Kantian moral self-
knowledge in the literature fails to articulate a satisfying answer to the fourth question above. 
That is, no account is able to provide an adequate account of why Kant thinks morality requires 
self-knowledge at all. Finally, in the third part, I argue that only by carefully attending to what 
has been referred to in the literature as “generic” self-knowledge, or what Kant, in the above, 
calls knowledge of ourselves “as belonging originally to the substance of a human being,” can 
we make sense of the practical importance of self-knowledge within Kant's ethical framework. I 
attempt to advance an interpretation of Kant's central claims regarding the role of self-knowledge 
in the ethical life that is both faithful to Kant's writings and that is itself a philosophically 
attractive defense of his controversial position that self-knowledge is a necessary condition of 
virtue.  
SECTION 1: KANT’S FIRST COMMAND 
 
 When Kant claims that our self-regarding duties command us to know ourselves, what, 
precisely, is he telling us to know? Because Kant’s first command concerns our moral lives, what 
we are commanded to know about ourselves must be, in some sense, morally relevant. It is 
reasonable to think that self-knowledge is morally relevant when it justifiably affects or serves as 
a basis for certain (positive or negative) moral judgments. Ostensibly, for Kant, the proper object 
of self-knowledge is one’s disposition. I then introduce and articulate Kant’s thesis of self-
3 
opacity, a problem that is born out of Kant’s epistemic and anthropological commitments. I 
observe that, paradoxically, on this reading, the self is opaque precisely where we are instructed, 
by Kant’s “first command,” to know it. Finally, I review the literature concerning Kant’s “first 
command,” what it requires of Kantian moral agents and how, despite the opacity of the self, 
Kantian moral agents might come to discharge the requirements of this odd command. This, in 
turn, will prepare the ground for an analysis of the important function that Kant takes self-
knowledge to have in the good life. 
1.1 “Know Thy Heart”: The Object of Self-Knowledge 
  In the passage quoted above, Kant claims that morality commands us to know our “heart” 
in terms of whether it is good or evil. The metaphorical language is suggestive, but imprecise. 
Fortunately, in the same passage, Kant links the question of whether one's heart is good or evil to 
the question of “whether the source of [one's] actions is pure or impure” (Ibid). This implies that 
one’s heart is the source of one’s actions. What our self-regarding duties command us to know, 
then, amounts to whether the source of our actions is pure or impure.  
Kant  consistently holds that the source of one's actions is one's character—or, as Kant 
likes to put it, one’s disposition, or Gesinnung (R 6:21-2, KpV 5:81, 5:84, 5:89, MM 6:393, GMS, 
4:406).2 Kant maintains that one's disposition is either pure or it is impure (R 6:23).3 If one's 
disposition is impure, then the source of one's actions is evil. If one's disposition is pure, then the 
source of one's actions is good (R 6:36).4 As Kelly Coble puts it, a pure Gesinnung is “a maxim 
                                                 
2
 Kant, Immanuel. Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: And Other Writings. Ed. Allen W. Wood and 
Giovanni George Di. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. (Hereafter R); Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical 
Reason. Ed. Mary J. Gregor and Andrews Reath. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997. (Hereafter, KpV). Kant, 
Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. Mary J Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. 
(Hereafter, GMS). 
3
 This is referred to in the literature and by Kant himself as rigorism. For a defense of Kantian rigorism, see  Coble, 
Kelly. "Kant's Dynamic Theory of Character." Kantian Review 7 (2003): 38-71. 27 July 2012. 
4
 See also: Coble, pp.. 39, Frierson, Patrick R. "Character and Evil in Kant's Moral Anthropology." Journal of the 
History of Philosophy 44.4 (2006): 623-34. Wood, Allen W. Kant's Ethical Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
4 
in which duty is the ultimate incentive, overriding self-love in all situations in which the 
incentives conflict,” while an impure Gesinnung is an underlying maxim in which self-love is the 
ultimate incentive, overriding the incentive of duty in situations in which the incentives conflict.5 
Morality requires that we make the satisfaction of our inclinations conditional upon our having 
fulfilled our duties.6 If we fulfill this requirement, our heart is “good.”  The command to know 
whether one's heart is good or evil is, at least ostensibly, identical to the command to know 
whether one has succeeded in cultivating a pure disposition.  
1.2 Self-Opacity 
  That the “first command” of all duties that we have to ourselves requires that we attempt 
to know the status of the disposition underlying our actions has raised some eyebrows. After all, 
Kant is elsewhere adamant that we cannot have such knowledge.  In the second Critique, for 
example, Kant writes that no example “of exact observation of the law” can be found in 
experience (KpV 5:47). In the Groundwork, he emphasizes that, “no certain example can be cited 
of the disposition to act from pure duty” (GMS 4:407). Finally, and dramatically, in the 
Metaphysics of Morals, Kant declares that “a human being cannot see into the depths of his own 
heart so as to be quite certain in even a single action of the purity of his moral intention and the 
sincerity of his disposition” (MM 6:392). Accordingly, we have no choice but to conclude that 
“the depths of the human heart are unfathomable” (MM 6:447).   
                                                                                                                                                             
1999. Guyer, Paul. "The Obligation to Be Virtuous: Kant's Conception of the Tugendverpflichtung." Social 
Philosophy and Policy 27 (2010): 206-32. 
5
 Coble, 39. 
6
 Importantly, this doctrine does not imply that one must fulfill all of one’s duties before one can satisfy any of one’s 
inclinations. For Kant, positive duties (such as duties to help others and to develop our talents) are wide or 
imperfect duties; this means that they can be discharged and ordered in any number of ways, and also that what 
we do to discharge them is largely up to us. Kant’s point is only that, when a token inclination conflicts with a 
token duty, persons with virtuous dispositions subordinate their inclinations to what morality requires. Thanks to 
Eric Wilson for pointing out this worry. 
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 These passages are characteristic of Kant’s general insistence that the self is 
fundamentally opaque. Our motives, and, indeed, our dispositions, are not the sorts of things that 
are straightforwardly accessible to us. This opacity is not just the result of the complexity of 
human motivation. In addition, Kant claims that, as human beings, we have a pernicious 
tendency to deceive ourselves. Self-deception takes many different forms, but one common 
manifestation of this tendency is our propensity to “ascribe to ourselves, without proof, a worth” 
that we do not possess (LE 27:610).7  Our interest in appearing morally upright entices us to 
“throw dust in our own eyes,” in order to blind us from the truth of our moral condition (R 6:38). 
For simplicity, with Owen Ware, I will refer to this general line of thought as Kant’s Opacity 
Thesis. It is this thesis, in various forms, that has led many to question the coherence of a 
command that would require us to judge the constitution of the disposition that underlies our 
actions. 
In light of the above considerations, most accounts of the Kant’s first command attempt 
to resolve the apparent tension between Kant's insistence that we can never truly know ourselves 
and his claim that we are commanded to do so. That is, they attempt to answer the question of 
how it is that we are supposed to know our disposition—by what means are we scrutinize, or 
fathom our hearts—given (a) our tendency to deceive ourselves and (b) the fact that our 
experience “contains merely appearances of the disposition that the moral law is concerned with” 
(KpV 5:99). Having laid the ground for a discussion of Kant's perplexing complex of views, we 
now turn to these accounts, each of which take it that the primary (and perhaps the only) object 
                                                 
7
 Kant, Immanuel. Lectures on Ethics. Ed. Peter Lauchlan Heath and J.B. Schneewind. New York: Cambridge UP, 
1997.  (Hereafter, LE). It is  worth noting that, even if the self-deception worry were successfully removed, the 
constitution of our disposition, due to Kant's transcendental epistemology, might  still lie outside our grasp. This 
would be true if the disposition (as is plausible) were an aspect of our noumenal, rather than our empirical 
character. There are reasons, however, to think that noumenal ignorance is not a significant worry for Kant’s 
views on self-knowledge. In any case, it makes little sense to consider the merits of such views until the more 
pressing problem of self-deception is resolved. 
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of self-knowledge is our own moral condition, that is, whether or not our heart is “good” or 
“evil.” 
1.3 Reconciling Kant's First Command with Self-Opacity: Some Recent Attempts 
One way to resolve the difficulty delineated above is to claim that Kant does not mean to 
rule out the possibility that we might attain knowledge of our disposition as such. Rather, in 
acknowledging the possibility of self-deception, he is merely criticizing one rather 
straightforward account of how we might attempt to know ourselves. Generally, the view in 
question asserts that human beings are capable of unproblematically determining what motives 
they have for acting via introspection   
So understood, Kant’s thesis self-opacity might be interpreted rather narrowly, intended 
only to guard against one naïve method according to which we might attempt to understand the 
source of our actions. On the introspective account, in attempting to know what motivates us, we 
“look inward,” and simply discern the motive we have from acting against a backdrop of other 
psychological and intentional states. The problem is that, in doing so, we are wont to find “just 
what we ourselves have put there.”8 That is, rather than learning what actually has motivated us 
through introspection, we are prone to engage in a sort of post-hoc rationalization of what it is 
that we have done. Notice that if Kant’s Opacity Thesis is merely targeting the view that we have 
direct cognitive access to the state of our disposition, as long as we “know ourselves” by means 
other than introspection, the tension between Kant’s Opacity Thesis and his first command 
disappears. This might seem a strange solution. By what other means might we come to know 
                                                 
8
 See esp. Wood, Allen. Kant’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge UP: 1999;  pp. 201. 
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the quality of our disposition? Owen Ware considers the possibility that we might know our 
disposition inferentially.9 
Since we are prone to deceive ourselves regarding the quality of our intentions and the 
principles we consciously take ourselves to act upon, we are required to attempt to know our 
disposition by examining our actions over time. Such a process will gradually allow us to judge 
the quality of our disposition without requiring us to have what we cannot have: direct cognitive 
access to our disposition, or the source of our actions. Such an inferential view helps make sense 
of Kant's claim that self-knowledge requires the comparison “of our past actions with their 
dutifulness” over time (LE 27:608). This account avoids the psychologically naïve mistake of 
taking our conscious intentions to accurately represent our motivations and also seems to 
alleviate the tension that appears characteristic of Kant's position.  
Indeed, it has been well-documented that, for Kant, principles, not actions, are the proper 
objects of moral judgment. In the Religion, Kant argues that when we judge a human being to be 
evil, we do not do so because he “performs actions that are evil...but because these are so 
constituted that they allow the inference of evil maxims in him” (R 6:20). When we judge our 
own character or that of another human being as being morally bad, we do based on the 
assumption that the action a person takes is indicative of something deeper: a morally deficient 
personal principle, or maxim. But the chain of inference does not stop with maxims.  Each 
maxim that a person adopts is indicative, in turn, of an even more general maxim or principle, 
and so on, until we reach the level of one's general disposition to either subordinate one's pursuit 
of happiness to one's pursuit of virtue or one's pursuit of virtue to one's pursuit of happiness 
(ibid). So, on an inferential account of Kantian self-knowledge, we observe our actions over 
                                                 
9
 Ware, Owen. “The Duty of Self-knowledge.” Philosophical and Phenomenological Research. LXXIX.3 (2009): 
671-97.   
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time; from our actions, we infer our maxims; finally, from our maxims, we infer the quality of 
our disposition. 
Initially, this looks like a promising way to reconcile Kant’s First Command with his 
Opacity Thesis. However, Kant elsewhere observes that from a given action, an inference to any 
number of maxims is possible: “between maxim and deed,” Kant writes, “there is still a wide 
gap” (R 6:47).  Not all maxims suggested by an action will represent the principle that actually 
motivated the agent to act. An agent might genuinely have adopted a maxim even when such a 
principle is not easily “read off” of her actions. Perhaps, due to the influence of a “stepmotherly 
nature,” she is unable to carry the principle of her will through to action (see: GMS 4:396). The 
problem with the inferential view, then, is twofold: First, actions admit of several different and 
conflicting interpretations. Second, the proper interpretation of a given action may be unavailable 
to the observer (even when the observer is the agent herself). Thus, in Dosteovsky's Crime and 
Punishment, when Raskolnikov gives his last twenty roubles to the grieving family of a dead 
drunkard, his action is interpreted by at least one other as having represented his desire to solicit 
the services of a prostitute. While Raskolnikov knows this to be false, he is not entirely sure, 
himself, whether his giving was motivated by guilt for having committed a murder, or by his 
appropriate sympathy for the poor family.10  
Onora O'Neill develops (though she eventually rejects) a modified inferential view that is 
capable of resolving these difficulties. Though Kant claims that we would be naïve to 
unreflectively take our consciously formulated maxims to represent our actual motivations, he 
never denies that we do have introspective access to maxims insofar as we consciously represent 
them to ourselves prior to, in the process of, or after acting. So, O’Neill observes, we come 
                                                 
10
 Dostoyevsky, Fyodor. Crime and Punishment. Trans. Constance Garnett. New York: Modern Library, 1950, pp. 
339-394. 
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closest to knowledge of our disposition by paying careful attention to the maxims that we 
consciously represent, in addition to our behavior over time.11 
O’Neill’s modification of Ware’s inferential account helps make sense of Kant's claim 
that the task of self-knowledge requires “justum sui aestimium,” or just self-assessment. Just self-
assessment consists in judging our moral worth by testing the maxim of our action “by the extent 
to which it is undertaken, not merely in accordance with, but for the sake of the law alone” (LE 
27:609). Clearly, for this procedure to yield the best results, we must pay attention to our states 
insofar as they are represented through introspection. Doing so narrows the body of eligible 
maxims implied by our actions, and, additionally, allows the categorical imperative to guide 
action before the fact. O’Neill’s position, accordingly, requires that we alternate back and forth 
between testing our consciously formulated maxims according to the categorical imperative and 
inferring from our actions (once committed) those maxims that might have actually moved us to 
act. As agents, we are then able to compare and match those maxims inferred from action with 
those that we represent to ourselves prior to or in the process of acting. From there, we infer 
whether or not the maxims suggested by this procedure imply that we have made the satisfaction 
of our inclinations contingent upon the demands of the moral law. We are left with the necessary 
resources to make an evaluative judgment concerning the purity of our disposition by combining 
the cognitive tools of introspection and inference. 
Ware argues that sophisticated inferential accounts of Kantian self-knowledge (such as 
O’Neill’s) still sit uneasily with Kant's Opacity Thesis. Recall that the problem of self-opacity 
results, not only from the complexity of human motivation, but also from the human propensity 
for self-deception. Even if we rely on some combination of introspection and inference to 
                                                 
11
 O'Neill Onora. “Kant's Virtues.” How Should One Live? Essays on the Virtues, pp. 93.Comp. Roger Crisp. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. 
10 
determine our maxims and their conformity with what morality requires, it seems that we will 
still be prone to deceive ourselves, to see ourselves as being morally better than we actually are.  
To see this, suppose my colleague is competing for a promotion. She is struggling to meet 
a deadline for an important assignment. If she does not meet this deadline, she is unlikely to be 
promoted. Since her and I have a good working relationship, I have a vested interest in seeing 
her promoted. (Suppose that if she is promoted, I know that she will assign me those projects that 
carry with them generous expense accounts.) Observing that she is struggling to meet her 
deadline, I consider offering to watch her children for a weekend, despite having work of my 
own to do. Before making the offer, I judge that this act is morally required of me. That said the 
act itself is not something that I desire to do. So construed, the maxim of my action, that which 
motivates me to overcome my own desire for a working weekend at home, is to “help others 
where I can.”  Now, I make the offer. Stepping back, I consider two (of many) possible 
interpretations of my action. On the one hand, I might have actually been motivated to act by 
purely moral concerns; on the other hand, perhaps what actually motivated me to act was my 
more selfish (long-term) interest in seeing my colleague promoted; my maxim was, actually, to 
“help others when it is advantageous to me in the long run.”  
Since one very important condition of my experience of self-approbation consists in my 
being motivated to act for the right kinds of reasons, the argument goes, I am more likely to 
select the former interpretation of my action. I am more likely to interpret my motives so as to 
represent myself as having been motivated by purely moral concerns. So, it is reasonable to think 
that the problem of self-deception, if mitigated by requiring that we consider both the maxims we 
represent to ourselves during action and the implications of our actions themselves when 
attempting to evaluate our disposition, is not thereby wholly resolved. The point is not that I have 
11 
done anything immoral by acting on this more self-interested principle, but, rather, that the 
question of whether or not I have subordinated my interests to moral considerations is left open, 
even after employing the methodology suggested in the early parts of O'Neill's essay. 
 One might worry, at this point, that the problem of self-deception is wholly intractable. 
Try as we might to assess ourselves impartially, our interest in appearing morally upright will 
always preclude our ability to obtain the sort of self-knowledge that Kant is after when he says 
that we are commanded to know hearts. In order to resolve this deeper worry, Ware invokes 
Kant's conception of conscience. Conscience, according to Ware, prevents the tendency of self-
deception from corrupting the pursuit of self-knowledge “all the way down.” In general, Ware 
holds that, because Kant holds an “erring conscience” to be an absurdity, agents may be said to 
know themselves by subjecting their disposition to the judgment of conscience. 
According to Ware, Kant thinks conscience allows us to perform two main functions. 
First, the agent submits her behavior to the judgment of conscience. Her conscience then impels 
her to make a “higher order judgment of whether or not [she] has properly incorporated moral 
principles into her actions.”12 In this task, conscience makes a judgment as to whether or not an 
agent’s maxims accord with the potential purity of her disposition. Has she successfully 
subordinated the pursuit of her interests to the commands of morality? In answering this 
question, and hence in making this sort of first-order judgment, conscience can easily lead 
individuals to make mistaken judgments regarding the quality of their character. Indeed, one 
might be mistaken for any number of reasons, and among these is that, because of the desire to 
be morally praiseworthy, an individual might judge that her maxims are constitutive of a pure 
disposition, when in fact they are not.13 
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 Ware, 692. 
13
 Ware, 691-2. 
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 If this is the only role that conscience plays, or the only type of judgment that conscience 
is capable of producing, then it is hard to make sense of Kant's claim that “an erring conscience 
is an absurdity.”14 But this is not the only role that conscience plays, nor are these the only sorts 
of judgments that conscience can produce. In its second role, conscience produces a judgment as 
to “whether I have consciously examined my duties or not.”15 It is in producing these kinds of 
judgments that conscience cannot err. While we might deceive ourselves in attributing to our 
disposition a purity that it does not have in order to avoid the harsh judgment of conscience, and 
while we can never be truly certain that conscience, in its first function, has yielded the correct 
judgment regarding the quality of our disposition, we cannot mistake whether or not we have 
honestly subjected ourselves to its judgment.  
As Ware puts it, in this task, conscience accuses or acquits a person “exactly where [she] 
is transparent: [her] sense of truthfulness.”16 As Kant puts it, “While I can indeed be mistaken at 
times in objective judgment as to whether something is a duty or not, I cannot be mistaken in my 
subjective judgment as to whether I have submitted it to my practical reason...for such a 
judgment” (MM 6:401). While we can be mistaken about the condition of our disposition, we 
cannot be mistaken that we have honestly tried to judge it. So, Ware reasons, the tension between 
Kant’s Opacity Thesis and his command, “know thyself,” disappears because conscience is 
capable of making at least one species of judgment that is not vulnerable to worries about self-
deception. 
Notice, however (as Ware himself notices): Even when inferential accounts of Kantian 
self-knowledge are supplemented with Kant's conception of conscience, we remain incapable of 
obtaining certainty of the state of our disposition. We can approximate the purity or impurity of 
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 Ware, 694. 
13 
our hearts, and, as Ware puts it, we can even form a justified “belief” regarding whether or not 
we have truly attempted to discharge our responsibility to “know” the latter, but we can never be 
sure that we have gotten it right, that we have not deceived ourselves in subtle ways regarding its 
actual constitution. This is an important implication of Kant's anthropology, not the result of 
flawed interpretation. The more sophisticated reconstructions of Kant’s position on moral self-
knowledge (such as Ware's) gesture at a satisfying answer to the question of how we are to 
assess our “moral condition,” or the purity or impurity of “the source” of our actions in light of 
the limits that Kant's anthropological and epistemological writings place upon our capacity to 
derive accurate moral knowledge of ourselves. It just so happens that we are forced to conclude 
that obtaining certainty regarding the state of our disposition is not possible. 
SECTION 2: THE MORAL POINT OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE 
 
 So far, we have seen that Kant’s Opacity Thesis implies that we are unable to obtain 
certainty regarding the quality of our disposition. The problem of self-deception is intractable. 
Nevertheless, Kant asserts the importance of self-knowledge in the very same work in which he 
seems to most adamantly deny its possibility (that is, in The Metaphysics of Morals). Extant 
accounts of Kantian self-knowledge are committed to the view that the disposition is the primary 
object of moral self-knowledge. But if this is the case, and it is impossible for us to judge 
accurately the quality of our disposition, one might legitimately wonder why the virtuous agent 
is commanded to strive after something impossible. Why not give up the pursuit of self-
knowledge and just act? In this section, I develop this line of questioning in detail. I then provide 




2.1 The Priority of Self-Knowledge 
The main flaw in existing interpretations of the place of Kantian self-knowledge in 
Kant’s moral philosophy is not that they are lacking in textual support, nor is it that they render 
some aspect of Kant's moral philosophy unattractive. Indeed, each account emphasizes the extent 
to which Kant's ethical thought is sensitive to the real limits of human knowledge and to the 
complexities of human motivation. Rather, the problem with even the most sophisticated 
accounts of the Kantian imperative to “know thyself” is that they fail to make any sense at all of 
Kant's claim that pursuing self-knowledge is the first command of all duties that we have to 
ourselves as moral beings. That is, they do a poor job of explaining the function that Kant 
envisions self-knowledge playing in the good life. 
What Kant means when he says self-knowledge is the first command of all duties to 
oneself is not exactly clear. The claim suggests that, in some way, knowing one's heart is 
something one must do before one is able to fulfill one's duties to oneself. For Kant, duties to 
ourselves are conceptually prior to duties to others.17 We must take some account of our duties to 
ourselves before we are in a position to address our duties to others. It is plausible to think that, 
when Kant calls self-knowledge the first command of our self-regarding duties, he means to 
claim that, just as duties to oneself must be, to an extent, pursued before duties to others can be 
pursued, so too must self-knowledge be pursued before duties to ourselves can be pursued.  
Vigilantius’s notes on Kant’s lectures  confirm this reading: “for fulfillment of all moral duties, it 
is first of all necessary to know oneself” (LE 27:608, my emphasis). This is significant. I am not 
in a position to undertake the duties I have to myself unless I have pursued self-knowledge; I am 
                                                 
17
 See, in particular: Denis, Lara. "Kant's Ethics and Duties to Oneself." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (1997): 
321-48. 21 July 2012 and Timmermann, Jens. "Kantian Duties to the Self, Explained and Defended." Philosophy 
81.3 (2006): 505-30. 2 July 2012. 
15 
not in a position to fulfill one's duties to others unless I have taken account of the duties that I 
have to myself. 
This is a strong claim. It seems to be an especially odd position to take if (a) the object of 
self-knowledge is our disposition, and (b) we can never achieve certain knowledge of our 
disposition. If we are commanded to strive know the state of our disposition before we can 
pursue our duties to ourselves (and, by extension, to others) and knowing the quality of our 
disposition requires observation of our acts over time, we might never reach a point at which it is 
appropriate for us to attempt to discharge our duties. 18 Even if we do reach such a point, it is not 
sufficiently clear why knowledge of our character is necessary in order that we may act as 
morality requires. 
Indeed, in light of Kant’s own views about how one is supposed to act, it is hard to see 
why he would take attaining knowledge of our disposition to be so important. In the 
Groundwork, for example, Kant seems to claim that we should approach our duties by (a) testing 
our maxims against the categorical imperative, and then (b) adopting or refraining from adopting 
any maxims that are required or forbidden by this process (GMS 4:421-424).19 And, as O'Neill 
notes, there's no reason that I need to know the quality of my disposition in order to strive to act 
according to morally required maxims.20 To put the worry simply, it is far from clear why we 
would need to know anything about our disposition in order to strive to fulfill our duties by the 
process that Kant lays out in the Groundwork. Indeed, it might seem that the opposite is true. 
Attempting to know our disposition might distract us from what matters in the ethical life: acting 
as duty requires. The central question becomes, then, not whether Kant, in light of his sensitivity 
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to the complexity of human motivation, can affirm some sort of responsibility to attain self-
knowledge, but rather why Kant would claim that such an obligation is, in some sense, a 
necessary condition for the fulfillment of our other duties given his other claims about moral 
deliberation and action. 
Since Kant does take the position that our duties require self-knowledge, there must be 
something about self-knowledge that renders us fit to do what morality requires of us. Each 
account of self-knowledge outlined above fails to shed light on this peculiar feature of Kant’s 
claims about self-knowledge. The problem is not simply that extant accounts of Kantian self-
knowledge do not mention why Kant takes self-knowledge to be so important; they do. They 
almost universally quote passages from The Metaphysics of Morals where Kant claims that self-
knowledge precludes arrogance and prevents misanthropy and self-loathing (MM 6:441). Yet, 
provided self-knowledge has the object (and only the object) that these authors claim it has (our 
disposition), this is odd. Why should I think that knowledge of my disposition will lead to me to 
be more modest, while preventing misanthropy and self-hatred? It seems that no plausible 
answer can be given to the question. If I find, on self-examination, that my disposition is pure, I 
am likely to feel good about myself. This seems more likely to lead to pride than arrogance 
(especially since Kant must countenance that this judgment might be mistaken). On the other 
hand, if I find that my disposition is impure, I may well start to hate myself. So the question 
remains: Why would we need to know whether or not we are good in order to bring it about that 
we become better human beings? 
Until this point, we have been working under the assumption that the point of self-
knowledge is to evaluate the quality of our disposition. However, this assumption is dubitable. 
Indeed, Emer O’Hagan develops an account of the purpose of Kantian self-knowledge that 
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begins by explicitly rejecting this assumption.21 O’Hagan recognizes that “In moral deliberation 
a focus on the quality of one’s will interferes with the moral project of judging what is 
required.”22 As a result, he concludes that self-knowledge, for Kant, is not intended to be an 
evaluative enterprise; its function is not to assess one’s own moral goodness. Rather, echoing 
Kant, he claims that “[t]he moral point of self-knowledge is to help to avoid self-illusion and to 
develop moral objectivity.”23  
We are to know our heart, according to O’Hagan, not in order to evaluate our disposition, 
but, rather, in order to understand our particular inclinations and the way in which they will 
induce us to act immorally: “if I know that I have certain tendencies to pride or pleasure then this 
knowledge enables me to select casuisitical possibilities which will reveal, and may rule out of 
play, those tendencies.”24 By comparing these tendencies with the requirements of the moral law, 
we avoid self-illusion. So-conceived, self-knowledge “is a cognitive capacity developed by 
keeping the theoretical foundation of Kantian ethics in mind. The theoretical foundation is used 
as a kind of compass which allows the agent to locate herself in the moral landscape.”25 By 
keeping the theoretical requirements of Kantian ethics firmly in mind, we are able to subvert 
self-deception.  
The novelty and appeal of O’Hagan’s suggestion should be apparent. On O’Hagan’s 
view, self-knowledge is not precluded by self-opacity, but is rather the solution to the problem of 
self-opacity. By paying attention to our inclinations and behavioral tendencies, we are less likely 
to place the motive of self-interest where the moral law belongs; self-knowledge aids us in 
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directing ourselves toward virtue in light of the particular drives to which we are susceptible. 
While much recommends this account, it has at least two serious problems.  
First, the notion that self-knowledge requires that agents reflect upon the theoretical 
requirements of Kantian ethics is deeply implausible. Most human beings will never encounter 
Kant’s theoretical apparatus, and any claim that human beings are, generally, required to make 
explicit use of Kant’s moral framework sits uneasily with Kant’s own characterization of his 
project as falling out of “common human reason” (GMS 4:393).  
Second, though O’Hagan’s account of Kant’s first command provides a clear rationale for 
the priority Kant assigns to self-knowledge, it does so only by begging the question. That is, 
O’Hagan’s account assumes that we can have easy knowledge of our moral condition and those 
inclinations that threaten it in situations in which it is threatened. But this is precisely what is at 
issue when attempting to resolve the tension between Kant’s Opacity Thesis and his injunction to 
know thyself. O’Hagan, accordingly, owes us an account of why self-deception does not block 
us from making use of the knowledge of our tendencies to guide us in developing a pure 
disposition.  
Despite these problems with O’Hagan’s view, his overall characterization of the point of 
Kant’s first command points us in the right direction. O’Hagen is right to suggest that part of the 
reason that Kant assigns priority to self-knowledge is that self-knowledge conduces to moral 
objectivity. From the above, it is now clear that O’Hagan fails to provide a non-question-begging 
answer to the question of why it is that self-knowledge is likely to help moral agents to develop 
objectivity, and how this sort of objectivity is possible in light of the problem of self-deception. 
Although O’Hagen’s concern with objectivity does not (as we will see) capture the full reason 
for Kant’s insistence that self-knowledge is a necessary condition of virtue, he does well to bring 
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the issue of objectivity into view. On the face of it, it is plausible that, insofar as our moral duties 
require that we be objective, or impartial (as Kant holds that they do), they also require that we 
take the necessary steps to bring it about that we are capable of impartiality. If we have an 
account of moral self-knowledge that gives us reason to believe that having moral self-
knowledge is a necessary condition of impartiality, then we would appear to have the start of an 
answer to the question of why it is necessary to obtain this sort of self-knowledge before we 
undertake to discharge our responsibilities.  
In what follows, I argue that, while moral self-knowledge does require attention to our 
disposition, this sort of self-knowledge is not doing much (if any) explanatory work in grounding 
Kant’s claim that self-knowledge is a necessary condition of virtue. Rather, the sort of moral 
self-knowledge that aids us in developing objectivity is what is referred to in the literature as 
“generic” self-knowledge.26 I argue that generic self-knowledge is a necessary condition of 
virtue because it (a) aids us, in a clear way, in developing moral objectivity and (b) requires that 
conceive of ourselves as moral agents. 
SECTION 3: SELF-KNOWLEDGE, OBJECTIVITY AND AGENCY 
 
 
Recall that Kant's first command to know our heart requires that we understand “what can 
be imputed to [us] as belonging originally to the substance of a human being” (MM 6:441). It is 
not immediately clear what this strange sentence is supposed to tell us about the requirements of 
self-knowledge. I think it is plausible to think that to understand what is imputable to us “as 
belonging to originally to the substance of a human being,” is to understand ourselves as 
members of the human species. When we understand ourselves in such a way, we infer that we 
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(ourselves) partake in those attributes that characterize the “substance” of humanity in general.27  
If this is correct, there are two ways of reading Kant’s claim that we must understand “what can 
be imputed to [us] as belonging originally to the substance of a human being.”  
 One way to read Kant’s claim above would be to suggest that the requirement to know 
what is imputable to us as members of the human species is reducible to the requirement to know 
what is imputable to us as individuals. On this reading, knowing what is imputable to us as 
human beings, generally, allows us to distinguish our unique contribution to our moral 
condition—how much of our character we are responsible for—but it does not require us to 
know anything over and above our own disposition. Perhaps it is better put like this: on this 
reading, knowing what can be imputed to us qua substance serves as a helpful, perhaps 
necessary, means toward knowing to what extent we have cultivated our disposition, which 
remains the proper (and only) object of self-knowledge. 
 Another way to read this aspect of Kant’s first command would be to maintain that 
knowing what is imputable to us qua substance is a unique requirement of the command to know 
ourselves, not reducible to the requirement to know our contribution to our disposition. In this 
case, we are required to know our contribution to our disposition in addition to what we are like 
as members of the human species. Read in this way, attaining knowledge of ourselves, qua 
human being, is necessary if one is to fully “know” one’s “heart.” Fully knowing your heart 
requires both knowledge of the type of person you are, as well as knowledge of the types of 
things persons are, or, better, of the types of hearts that persons have. Since the former type of 
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knowledge is unable to explain why self-knowledge might be a necessary condition of virtue, it 
is worth considering whether or not the latter requirement of Kant’s first command is in a better 
position to offer such an explanation. 
We have seen that Kant holds that we need to know ourselves before we are in a position 
to cultivate a virtuous disposition. In what follows, I argue that understanding the full import of 
this claim requires developing an account of what I will hereafter refer to as “generic” self 
knowledge. By generic self-knowledge, I simply mean knowledge of oneself as a human being. 
What we are required to know about ourselves, qua human being, provides a clear rationale for 
Kant’s controversial position that we must know ourselves before our duties to ourselves and to 
others can be pursued.  
3.1 Generic Self-Knowledge  
Surprisingly, other commentators28 have distinguished between these two potential 
objects of self-knowledge (our disposition, on the one hand, and the characteristics of humanity 
in general, on the other). Most conclude that generic self-knowledge is, at best, of secondary 
importance. Its importance derives from its function as a backdrop against which we can discern 
the quality of our idiosyncratic hearts. In this way, generic self-knowledge serves as a sort of 
measuring stick for discerning the extent of our moral progress. If we know where we began, we 
are in a better position to know how far we have come. Only Jeanine Grenberg has undertaken to 
explicate what it would look like to take seriously the notion that we are supposed to know 
ourselves as human beings in general, as a unique requirement of self-knowledge.29 
Perhaps the tendency to relegate the second aspect of Kant’s first command to derivative 
status is understandable. It seems admittedly strange to count knowledge about ourselves as 
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human beings as self-knowledge at all: What we are as selves is what sets us apart from other 
creatures like us. But, it is worth remembering the extent to which Kant saw his “critical” 
philosophy as an exercise in self-knowledge, despite the fact that it does not concern itself at all 
with the idiosyncrasies of individual persons.30 If I am correct in arguing that knowledge of what 
can be imputed to us as belonging to the “substance” of the human being is basically knowledge 
of ourselves as members of the human species, we must next determine which attributes of the 
human species are relevant to Kant's inquiry. Human beings without congenital defects are 
featherless bipeds, but surely this is not the sort of attribute that Kant has in mind. 
I take it that, generally, knowing ourselves, qua human being, will require us to 
understand ourselves in light of (a) what Kant calls the “radical propensity to evil” that inheres in 
human nature, and (b) what he calls the human “predisposition to the good.” Kant holds that each 
of these is, in some sense, a universal attribute of human beings. There is strong reason to believe 
that this is the sort of knowledge Kant has in mind when he asserts that we must know what is 
imputable to us as belonging to the “substance” human being. This is because Kant explicitly 
mentions (b) and alludes to (a) immediately after introducing the first command itself (MM 
6:441).  
In what follows, I argue that Kant's inclusion of this kind of generic self-knowledge in his 
first command provides a clear rationale for Kant’s claim that self-knowledge is conceptually 
prior to our other moral responsibilities. I argue that (1) understanding the human predisposition 
to evil helps us to develop moral objectivity in moral deliberation and (2) understanding 
ourselves as predisposed to the good is a necessary condition of conceiving of ourselves as moral 
agents. 
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3.2 The Propensity to Evil and the Inducement to Objectivity 
After claiming that we are commanded to attempt moral cognition of ourselves, Kant 
writes that doing so will “counteract that egotistical self-esteem which takes mere wishes...for 
proof of a good heart” (MM 6:441). This should remind us of O’Hagan’s claim that one function 
of self-knowledge is to ward off self-conceit and self-illusion. Self-knowledge, it turns out, is 
likely to have this effect because, on Kant’s conception of virtue, as Vigilantius records, “The 
attainment of a total agreement [between an individual’s disposition and the pure disposition that 
morality requires] is a thing that man is far removed from” (LE 27:609). When we cognize 
ourselves, we necessarily perceive “the insignificance of our moral worth in consciousness of its 
inadequacy to the law” (LE 27:610). However, as we have seen, merely attempting to know our 
disposition is unlikely to counteract egotistical self-esteem in this way.  
 Indeed, when attempting to cognize ourselves in terms of our unique contribution to our 
moral condition, we will not always notice the insignificance of our moral worth. Sometimes, we 
will search only to find just what we hoped that we would find—   that our disposition is pure. 
But clearly, insofar as it is by forcing us to recognize our lack of moral worth in comparison with 
the moral law that self-knowledge counteracts “egotistical self-esteem,” the assumption is that 
everyone, when cognizing herself, will notice such a lack of worth. Notice the contrast between 
the conclusions we are supposed to draw (as we attempt to discharge Kant’s first command) and 
the conclusions that we are likely to draw (if the sole object of self-knowledge is our disposition). 
To understand why Kant thought self-knowledge an antidote to moral arrogance, we must 
understand that, for Kant, self-knowledge requires understanding what he calls the “propensity to 
evil” (R 6:29-44). 
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Kant holds that the propensity to moral evil “belongs to the human being universally” (R 
6:29). Recall that, for Kant, evil consists in the subordination of the commands of morality to 
one's inclinations. Kant holds that because experience furnishes us with so many examples of 
this tendency, we can “spare ourselves the formal proof that there must be such a corrupt 
propensity rooted in the human being” (R 6:32). Kant’s first command includes a requirement to 
understand ourselves in terms of the human propensity to evil. This requirement of self-
knowledge is doing most of the work to support Kant’s claim that self-knowledge is antithetical, 
in a strong sense, to “egotistical self-esteem.”  
Understanding ourselves in light of the human propensity to evil requires that we make 
the inference that, as human beings, we, too, are marked out by this propensity.31 Accordingly, 
generic self-knowledge is instrumental in allowing us to develop objectivity. In particular, 
because we understand, by inference from facts we know about the species to which we belong, 
that we are “far removed from” the ideal of virtue, we will (a) reject any conception of ourselves 
as being fully virtuous (as might result from other attempts to evaluate ourselves) and, 
accordingly, (b) conceive of our duties objectively. Thus, generic self-knowledge impels us to 
assume, when evaluating the quality of our disposition, that we have almost certainly not 
achieved virtue, and that, in this regard, there is much work to be done. 
Now, one might plausibly think that, because one does not need proof (or even a very 
discerning eye) to understand that humanity is characterized by a general propensity to evil, 
knowledge of this propensity cannot be required at all. Hence, the argument goes, it certainly 
cannot be a component of Kant’s “first command.” Owen Ware makes precisely this argument. 
Ware writes that, because “the notion we have of humanity's corruption arises necessarily in 
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experience... a duty to know it would be vacuous.”32 Since we must recognize in experience that 
human beings are generically evil, it would be redundant to say that we have a duty to know that, 
as members of the human species, we are, ourselves, generically evil as well. However, from the 
fact that we recognize that human beings, in general, tend to treat their own happiness as 
weightier than the commands of morality, it plainly does not follow that we recognize this fact 
about ourselves.  
Kant's concern that we might deceive ourselves makes it clear that we might (and, indeed, 
that we often will) affirm, simultaneously, that (a) humanity has a general propensity to evil and 
(b) that we, ourselves, are exempt from that generalization. If one thinks this implausible, one 
need look no further than contemporary empirical psychology. Psychologists continue to find 
evidence for what they have deemed the optimism bias: individual persons remain incredibly 
optimistic about themselves, even while simultaneously holding negative views about human 
nature, generally.33 As we have seen, we can never fully get beyond our tendency to self-deceive 
and attribute to ourselves purer motives than we actually have. The reason that self-knowledge 
requires us to make inference from the generic human propensity to evil, to our own evil 
tendencies, then, is to provide us with a constant reminder that, for creatures like us, “virtue is 
always in progress.” Beings like us can “never settle down in peace and quiet with [our] maxims 
adopted once and for all” (MM 6:409).  Virtue is an ideal that we must constantly strive to fulfill, 
no matter how good we might judge our “moral condition” to be at any given time. 
To summarize, if we take Kant’s claim that we must know what can be “imputed to us 
originally as belonging to the substance of a human being,” to be a unique requirement of self-
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knowledge (not reducible to the command to know one’s disposition) it becomes clear why self-
knowledge will help us to develop objectivity, why self-knowledge will “counteract egotistical 
self-esteem.” After claiming that our duties command us to know ourselves, Kant observes that, 
in striving toward virtue, we must attempt to remove “an obstacle” that inheres in every human 
heart. It is now clear that the obstacle to which Kant refers is just the human propensity to evil 
(see MM 6:441). This, in turn, sheds light on why it is that self-knowledge helps us fulfill our 
duties. Simply put, understanding the general facts about human beings, and about ourselves, as 
members of our species, makes us less likely to take our duties to ourselves and others lightly. 
Even when we evaluate our disposition as pure, the universality of the propensity to evil will 
induce us to assume that we have not yet succeeded in subordinating our inclinations to the 
requirements of morality, that we have not done enough to warrant the judgment that we have set 
obligatory ends. Having come to this realization, we will continue to strive, as best we can, to 
effect a change, or “revolution,” within.  
While developing objectivity by understanding the implications of the human propensity 
to evil is bound to be helpful to us as we attempt to discharge our duties to self and others, one 
might object that this is not sufficient to warrant Kant’s strong conclusion that self-knowledge is 
a necessary condition of virtue. While objectivity might place us in a better position to fulfill our 
duties, it simply is not the case that we are unable to address our duties prior to obtaining the 
self-knowledge that makes objectivity possible. Kant’s position does not suggest merely that we 
will be better able to do what duty requires of us if we know ourselves. He argues that if we do 
not undertake to know ourselves, we will be incapable of addressing our duties at all. To 
understand why Kant takes the stronger position here, it is crucial to understand the second 
requirement of generic self-knowledge: The human predisposition to the good.  
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3.3 The “Predisposition to the Good” and Moral Agency 
 Importantly, if it were the case that the only thing imputable to the human species were 
radical evil, Kant’s moral psychology might be justifiably condemned as overly pessimistic (as 
Goethe worried it had become). But Kant clearly did not intend for his moral psychology to 
engender in us a sense of contempt for the species to which we belong. Indeed, Kant writes that, 
in addition to helping us to dispense with “egotistical self-esteem,” attempting to know oneself 
dispels “fanatical contempt for oneself as a human being (for the whole human race)” (MM 
6:441).  
 Though we have been focusing so far on the extent to which self-deception entices us to 
see ourselves as better than we actually are, Kant thinks that this is far from the only way that we 
commonly deceive ourselves. Sometimes, we are prone to seeing ourselves as worthless, pushed 
and pulled by our inclinations, wholly lacking agency, or worse. On Kant’s account, this latter 
tendency involves just as much an error, perhaps even graver an error, as does the tendency 
toward moral arrogance. Kant's claim that the human race is characterized by a propensity to evil 
does not license misanthropy precisely because it is not to be understood in isolation.  
 Instead, Kant emphasizes that, even more important than understanding the implications 
of the propensity to evil, is understanding ourselves as beings whose constitution is characterized 
by a predisposition to the good (MM 6:441). Kant’s contention is that, by paying attention to our 
capacities as rational beings, and in particular, to the extent to which human beings are, as he 
puts it, “predisposed to the good,” we necessarily conceive of ourselves as moral agents. 
Conceiving of ourselves in this way is antithetical to “fanatical self-contempt” because it reveals 
to us the full extent of our moral potential. Conceiving of ourselves and those around us as moral 
agents makes us less likely, in light of our moral failings (indeed, in light of the evil we see all 
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around us), to give up on virtue. These considerations begin to bring into view Kant's complete 
answer to the question of why Kant claims that self-knowledge is first command of all duties to 
oneself. 
  Briefly after introducing his first command, Kant explicitly claims that he views 
contempt for humanity as a contradiction. He then reminds us that it is only “through the noble 
predisposition to the good in us, which makes the human being worthy of respect, that one can 
find one who acts contrary to it contemptible” (ibid). There are at least two things of importance 
to note here. First, in the above, Kant claims that the predisposition to the good is what makes 
human beings worthy of respect; second, he claims that it is by virtue of the predisposition to the 
good that we are capable of understanding the difference between good and evil. In this section, 
with these central claims in mind, I elaborate on Kant’s conception of the predisposition to the 
good, tying it together closely with what Kant calls “the fact of reason,” in the second Critique. 
In particular, I claim that Kant's fact of reason (shorthand, I take it, for phenomenology Kant has 
already laid out in the Groundwork) is what enables us to understand ourselves in terms of the 
“predisposition to the good.” I then argue that it is only by virtue of what this “fact of reason” 
tells us about ourselves that we are capable of seeing ourselves as moral agents. Finally, I argue 
that this is the primary reason Kant thought self-knowledge so important. Quite literally, if we 
fail to know ourselves, we will fail to see ourselves as moral agents. If we do not see ourselves as 
moral agents, we will be incapable of (as opposed to merely unskilled at) cultivating virtue. 
 In the Religion, Kant breaks the predisposition to the good into three distinct 
predispositions: the predisposition to animality, the predisposition to humanity, and the 
predisposition to personality. Recall that, in The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant claims that it is the 
“noble predisposition to the good in us” that makes human beings the proper objects of respect 
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(MM 6:441, emphasis added). Strikingly, in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant makes the 
same observation regarding our ability to respect the “moral law” as an incentive: It is by virtue 
of our ability to respect the moral law and treat it as an incentive that we are worthy of respect 
(KpV 5:87). Again, strikingly, Kant defines the predisposition to personality as our 
“susceptibility to respect... the moral law as of itself a sufficient incentive to the power of 
choice” (R 6:28).  Hence, it is reasonable to think that when Kant claims that it is the distinctly 
noble predisposition to the good in us that makes human beings worthy of respect, he has in 
mind that component of the predisposition to the good that he deems the predisposition to 
personality. In the simplest possible terms, the predisposition to personality is what marks as out 
as the types of creatures that are susceptible to the commands of morality in the first place.   
 I take myself here to be attributing to Kant a stronger claim than the one that Jeanine 
Grenberg attributes to him in her recent book, Kant and the Ethics of Humility. There, Grenberg 
writes that generic self-knowledge requires that we recognize ourselves as “dependent and 
corrupt but capable and dignified rational agents.”34 Conceiving of ourselves in such a way, 
according to Grenberg, is likely to remind agents to be humble when assessing their worth and 
prevent them from becoming discouraged that they are incapable of fully attaining virtue. I take 
it that this is an important insight. But it is not merely that Kant's first command requires that we 
view ourselves as a particular type of agent (though it does require this). Commanding us to 
recognize and understand ourselves as predisposed to the good is what enables us to see 
ourselves as agents in the first place. And it is for this reason, above all others, that pursuing self-
knowledge is a requirement of virtue.  
 At this point, one might wonder by what means we are to know ourselves in terms of the 
predisposition to the good. Recall that the propensity to evil, as a requirement of generic self-
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knowledge, is readily knowable. In fact, one cannot spend much time among human beings 
without noticing that they frequently fail to act as morality requires them to act. Evidence for the 
predisposition to the good, on the other hand, appears to be somewhat harder to find. Not only 
are there certain philosophers (Hobbes and Mandeville are good examples) that call into question 
the notion human beings are capable of anything like moral agency, it appears that, in observing 
ourselves and our fellows, we seldom have a very hard time seeing our way to a selfish 
interpretation of even the most apparently dutiful action. In light of this, Kant needs to provide us 
with an account of how it is possible to undertake to know oneself in terms of the predisposition 
to good which does not readily show itself.  It is my view that Kant's answer to this question can 
be found in his second Critique.  
 In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant argues that we are, in some sense, aware of “the 
moral law” as a “fact of reason.”  (KpV 5:30, 5:31, 5:32, 5:42, 5:43, 5:44, 5:47). Kant cannot 
mean that the moral law, which he calls the categorical imperative in the Groundwork, is 
something that human beings universally and necessarily represent to themselves during 
deliberation in abstract form. Besides being highly implausible, Kant straightforwardly denies 
that these abstract principles play any explicit role in our everyday practical reasoning (see: GMS 
4:403).  
 Though we may never consciously represent the categorical imperative in the abstract 
during deliberation, we are phenomenologically familiar with the sometimes unpleasant pull of 
obligation toward certain ends, in spite of the fact that we incline toward others. I take this to be 
a more phenomenologically apt way of saying that in deliberating and acting, we are aware of 
the moral law as binding. This awareness that moral imperatives ought to trump imperatives that 
result from our desires, if we pay sufficient attention to it, allows us to cognize ourselves as free. 
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Reflection on the capacities that enable us to be free allows us to understand ourselves as beings 
predisposed to the good, whose “highest practical vocation” is to develop a disposition in 
conformity to virtue. In this way, Kant's fact of reason becomes an important means through 
which we are able to see ourselves as predisposed to the good, in other words, as moral agents.  
For Kant, beings like us have “two standpoints from which [we] can regard [ourselves] 
and cognize laws for the use of [our] powers” (GMS 4:452). From the first standpoint, we view 
ourselves as objects of the “sensible world,” and our wills determined by our inclinations “under 
laws of nature,” hence, heteronomously (by external forces). From the second standpoint, we 
view ourselves as members of the “intelligible world,” and our wills determined “under laws 
which, being independent of nature, are not empirical but grounded merely in reason,” hence, 
autonomously (by our selves) (ibid). Our capacity for autonomy, a robust sort of positive 
freedom characterized by “freedom and independence from the mechanism of the whole of 
nature,” is possible only because we are capable of determining our wills according to “special 
laws.” These special laws are moral, rather than causal, laws. Reflecting on the fact of reason 
compels us to see ourselves as free. We are never totally at the mercy of our inclinations. In turn, 
the fact that our freedom is possible only in virtue of our being bound forces us to recognize 
ourselves as moral agents. This connection between morality and freedom (which Kant thinks is 
one of reciprocal implication, see: KpV 5:29) compels us to regard our “own nature in reference 
to [our] second and highest vocation...and its laws with the highest respect” (KpV 5:87). 
We understand as a fact of reason that morality requires that we subordinate our interests 
to its commands. Accordingly, when given the choice between two acts, one of which satisfies 
our inclinations and is immoral and the other of which requires the frustration of our desires, it is 
not open to us to appeal to the strength of the latter as an excuse. This sort of freedom from 
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sensibility, made possible by our ability to act according to moral imperatives, is precisely what 
constitutes autonomy, for Kant (KpV 5:31). If we replace this purely formal condition with other 
conditions external to us (including our inclinations), then our will is no longer autonomous—its 
determining ground lies in some sought-after object, in our desires, and hence, not in law-giving 
reason. Despite this, by virtue of the predisposition to good that is present universally in human 
beings, we always have the capacity for autonomous action, if only we recognize how our 
rational capacities bind us. For Kant, therefore, if we are to properly understand ourselves and 
the reasons for which we act, it is of the utmost importance to maintain the purity of the moral 
law which “elevates a human being above himself...[and] connects him with an order of things 
that only the understanding can think” (KpV 5:86-7).   
 Kant holds that, were it not for our awareness of the moral law, and for the autonomy that 
the latter makes possible, we would not have any duties at all, nor would we be able to discern 
good from evil (MM 6:417-8; 6:441). The primary reason that Kant holds self-knowledge to be a 
necessary condition of virtue is that, if we do not look inward and recognize among the major 
implication of this fact of reason (that we are predisposed to the good), we will fail to view 
ourselves as properly having duties at all (LE 27:357).   
 The second requirement of generic self-knowledge, therefore, requires that we cognize 
ourselves in our innate capacity to attribute “a free person” to ourselves to whom “all duties that 
are incumbent on [us]...take account of” us as beings that act “in freedom” (LE 27:626). It 
requires that we see ourselves as capable of placing ourselves under obligation, and it requires 
that we see ourselves as capable of doing that which we're obligated to do. All of this is simply to 
say that self-knowledge requires that we understand ourselves as predisposed to the good. We 
are to understand ourselves as predisposed to the good by “cognizing” our intelligible selves, 
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which is possible only in “morally practical relations,” that is  to say, I think, by paying attention 
to how we  exercise our faculties during practical deliberation (MM 6:418).  
Kant’s claim that self-knowledge is a necessary condition of virtue begins to look much 
more plausible with these considerations in view. Our very recognition of the difference between 
good and evil can be explained only in view of our being aware of the pull of obligation as a 
“fact of reason.”  Were we not the types of creatures endowed with such an awareness, we would 
not be capable of seeing the human propensity to evil as a regrettable fact about us, or even as 
something interesting, much less something that we should be striving to overcome. 
 One might object to this, however. If the commands of morality, and through them, the 
conditions of our freedom, assert themselves upon us involuntarily—if we “must” conceive of 
ourselves as free during rational deliberation—in what sense does it make sense to command us 
to know them? Kant’s claim concerning the availability and necessity of our conceiving of 
ourselves as autonomous moral agents seems to render a command to know it rather vacuous 
(recall Ware's worry about the propensity to evil, now, though, from a different angle). Not only 
does Kant call “the moral law” a fact of reason: in the Groundwork, after arriving at the first 
formulation of the categorical imperative, Kant remarks that common human reason always has 
the moral law “before its eyes and uses [it] as the norm for its appraisals” (GMS 4:403-4). But if 
the moral law is found in even the most common human beings, even in “scoundrels,” it is 
insufficiently clear why our duties command that we understand its implications.  
I take it that a plausible answer to this compelling objection can be made only by 
remaining sensitive to Kant’s worries that our understanding of the moral law might be 
contaminated by the pervasive influence of self-interest. Later in the Groundwork, Kant notes 
that because we are needy creatures with powerful inclinations, there arises within us a “natural 
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dialectic,” which Kant further characterizes as a “propensity to rationalize against [the] strict 
laws of duty and to cast doubt upon their validity” (GMS 4:405). Given the strength of our 
desires, we are prone to make exceptions for ourselves against what morality requires. What's 
worse is that sometimes this dialectic contaminates our understanding the moral law itself by 
locating the metric of moral worth elsewhere, perhaps in the quality of our inclinations, rather 
than in the extent to which we have a “disposition in accord with” the requirements of the moral 
law” (KpV 5:73).  
Kant writes that “we find our nature as sensible beings so constituted that the matter of 
the faculty of desire (objects of inclination, whether of hope or fear) first forces itself upon us, 
and we find our pathologically determinable self... striving antecedently to make its claims 
primary and originally valid just as if it constituted our entire self” (KpV 5:74). The command to 
know ourselves, then, requires that we refuse to view our desires as constituting our entire self.35 
We are required to recognize that our desires and our past might go a long way in explaining 
why we've done what we have done. But, if we are only honest with ourselves, we understand 
that the latter are unable to act as the sorts of considerations that would ultimately excuse what 
we have done (KpV 5:99). 
If one takes the above considerations seriously, the inconsistency between Kant’s claim 
that the all human beings operate with an implicit understanding of the nature of morality and my 
argument that we are commanded to understand the implications of the latter disappear. We are 
commanded to know ourselves, and, in doing so, to view ourselves as moral agents, because so 
much in us recoils from the implications of the conclusion that we are autonomous. On this 
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point, Kant’s position concerning moral self-knowledge has an illuminating analogue in his 
discussion of enlightenment.  
Kant characterizes enlightenment as “man’s emergence from his self-imposed nonage;” 
where nonage is then characterized as a special kind of immaturity consisting in our refusal to 
think independently (E 1).36 According to Kant, many fully grown human beings refuse to shake 
off this immaturity because of cowardice or laziness. Indeed, Kant writes, “If I have a book to 
serve as my understanding, a pastor to serve as my conscience, a physician to determine my diet 
for me…I need not exert myself at all” (E 1, my emphasis).  
Human beings, especially in an age of ever increasing communication and commerce, 
have at their disposal a vast array of resources, which, in various respects, make life easier. 
While an easier life is surely, on balance, a positive development in human history, it is just as 
sure that ease is attended with certain dangers. Insofar as individuals take their beliefs from their 
environment, from their church and from their education, and do not attempt to take an active 
role in the process of belief-formation, they fail to live up to their moral potential. Insofar as 
beliefs formed in such a way concern morality, the result is heteronomy of the will. Since the 
content and origin of beliefs are each surely relevant to moral practice, this is especially 
problematic.  
If we merely take our beliefs from the world outside and then act on them, there is no 
guarantee whatsoever that we are actually pursuing the same ends we would pursue if actively 
laying down the law for ourselves. Indeed, on Kant’s account of action, it is not sufficiently clear 
that our behavior will even qualify as “action,” as it may not follow from the adoption of 
principles at all. Thus, J.B. Schneewind observes that the “failure of courage to use our own 
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reason is a moral failure.”37 The solution to the problem of nonage that Kant identifies in his 
essay on enlightenment is to employ courage in facing the facts about one's own intellectual 
freedom. As a heuristic, he suggests that we ask ourselves whether “everyone could believe” on 
grounds such as we believe. If not, we are failing to face courageously the burden that our 
capacities as rational beings place upon us. Kant considers reflection on the requirements of our 
own reason an antidote toward this self-imposed problem precisely because such requirements 
assert themselves upon us involuntarily.  
Concerning our intellectual responsibilities as well as our moral responsibilities, Kant 
displays a strong (perhaps too strong) degree of confidence that, if only human beings are honest 
with themselves in assessing the types of creatures that they are in light of the sort of capacities 
that they make use of, they will realize that their passivity exhibits a form of bad faith. Far from 
implying that a duty to understand the implication of what Kant calls “the fact of reason” would 
be vacuous, the fact that awareness of the moral law is undeniable for creatures like us provides a 
solution to the problem of self-imposed immaturity in moral, as well as intellectual matters. 
SECTION 4: SELF-KNOWLEDGE, EPISTEMIC HUMILITY AND VIRTUE 
 
The first command of all duties that we have to ourselves requires that we understand 
ourselves in terms of our capacities and in terms of our constitution as finite, rational beings. One 
might claim that this conjecture is deeply implausible. Kant is clear that we are commanded to 
know our disposition, and that is the claim he should have made. To call knowledge of ourselves 
as substance self-knowledge is a category mistake. If Kant thought that generic self-knowledge 
was so important, he would not have proclaimed that the first command of all duties to oneself is 
to “know thy heart.” Surely there is something to this objection. But, it seems undeniable that 
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part of what it will mean to know our heart is to know what type of heart we possess. In our case, 
our human heart's makeup is rather simple. It consists of a strong desire to be happy and a strong 
desire to be worthy of happiness.  
We recognize, along with even the most “common human reason” that morality consists 
essentially in the constitution of our will (GMS 4:393). When we attempt to know our 
disposition, that is, how our will is constituted, we are forced to recognize that our own 
contribution to its quality is beyond our reach. We cannot be sure, due to the presence of 
countervailing incentives, that we have ever successfully acted for purely moral reasons. The fact 
that morality requires that duty be the “sufficient incentive” that determines the will, in other 
words implies we can never therefore know if we have fulfilled our duty. Recognition that we 
are needy, finite beings whose interest in being happy is often placed ahead of our interest in 
being worthy of happiness suggests to us that we probably have a long way to go in cultivating 
the pure disposition that virtue requires. Recognition that we are moral agents endowed with the 
capacity to determine our will autonomously impels us to recognize our moral potential. In light 
of the epistemic limits that our complex psychology imposes upon us, knowledge of our generic 
human hearts keeps us oriented toward our “highest practical vocation.”  
One cannot help but notice the Socratic character of Kant’s First Command.38 After all, it 
was Socrates, serving as Plato’s mouthpiece in The Republic, who first called our philosophical 
attention to the inscription at Delphi, which reads, “Know Thyself.”39 It was Socrates, too, that 
stressed, during his trial, that the hallmark of human wisdom (sophia) is constituted, in large 
part, by the recognition of one’s own ignorance.40 Self-knowledge, for Kant, serves as a reminder 
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of our ignorance, our tendency to infer too quickly that we have attained knowledge, on the one 
hand, and an injunction to strive to fulfill our potential, on the other. This is, after all, why Kant 
claims that “[m]oral cognition of oneself” is “the beginning of all human wisdom” (MM 6:441). 
And, indeed, Kant's Socratism shows through here as well. Recall that for Socrates, wisdom is 
constitutive of virtue. For Kant, as well, “the ultimate wisdom... consists in the harmony of a 
human being's will with its final end,” which, for Kant is to cultivate virtue (ibid).  
If we believe, after inspection, that our disposition leaves no space for blame, and is 
hence pure, recognition of our ignorance, that is, of the extent to which our selves are opaque to 
us, will humble us. Understanding ourselves as human, and hence as having a certain propensity 
to evil, reminds us that judgments of ourselves as wholly virtuous are likely mistaken. Because 
we cannot exempt ourselves from what we take to be the universal condition of our species, we 
are humbled by this recognition. Through humility, we become more objective.41 One might 
worry that this inability to know anything about our moral worth is likely to entice us to give up 
on the project of virtue. This worry turns out groundless. Generic  knowledge of our hearts, of 
the types of creatures that we are requires us to come up against the moral law and through it, our 
moral potential. In light of all the evil that inheres in human nature, we are moral agents 
precisely because we recognize the authority of a law laid down for us by the activity of our own 
rational faculties.  Each requirement of generic self-knowledge enables us to fulfill the principal 
duty that falls out of Kant’s First Command: that we are to be sincere in appraising our inner 
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worth in comparison with our duty (MM 6:442). As J.B. Schneewind puts it, “In moral matters 
we are all equally failures; but we all have essentially the same ability to get things right.”42 
CONCLUSION 
Self-knowledge, finally, is a necessary condition of virtue because if we do not attend to 
the sorts of creatures that we are, we will fail to be the sorts of agents that morality requires us to 
be. We will be prone to overestimate or underestimate our moral potential, which will lead us to 
prematurely judge that we have discharged all of our duties on the one hand, or give up on them 
completely on the other. Worse: if we remain completely ignorant of ourselves and the types of 
creatures that we are, Kant holds that we will not recognize that we have duties at all. Part of 
Kant's injunction to “know thy heart” requires that, as individuals, we strive to understand 
ourselves as members of the human species. Our membership in this group carries with it certain 
baggage that, if we are honest with ourselves, we must infer belong also to us as individuals.  
Kant's first command requires that we understand the extent to which virtue is, for beings 
like us, an ideal to strive after, that we are unlikely to fulfill. But it also requires that we keep in 
clear view our potential as autonomous moral agents. Attention to the propensity to evil achieves 
the first goal, and understanding ourselves as predisposed to the good achieves the second.  
In the end, it seems Kant’s injunction, know yourself, is both simpler and more complex than it 
might at first have appeared.  
In the Preface of the first Critique, Kant quotes a piece of verse written by Persius. It 
reads: “Dwell in your own house and you will know how simple your possessions are” (KrV 
Axx).  It is in this spirit that I think we should read Kant on the issue of moral self-knowledge. It 
is easy to get distracted by Kant's claim that the object of self-knowledge is our disposition, 
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which he has situated beyond our epistemic reach. But if we attend carefully to that which Kant 
claims is achieved by attempting to know our hearts, it becomes apparent that much of what we 
need to understand about ourselves is not, after all, idiosyncratic to us, and, in understanding this, 
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